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was the initial step in the removal of arbitrary limitations, though recognizing the need for some guidelines in the area of bystander recovery.
Archibald, in liberally construing these guidelines, has accelerated the
trend. With the possibility of New York supplying additional momentum,22

one might look forward to the gradual acceptance of this more

equitable though challenging approach in the area of recovery for
emotional and mental distress.
ROBERT L. WALKER

Criminal Law-DOUBLE JEoPARDY-Benton v. Maryland, 89 S. Ct.
2056 (1969).

The defendant was tried in a Maryland state court on charges of
burglary and larceny. He was acquitted of larceny, but convicted of
burglary. Due to a defect in the composition of the grand and petit
juries, the defendant was forced to waive the former jeopardy of larceny, and was retried and convicted on both counts." Upon appeal the
Supreme Court in reversing the larceny conviction held that freedom
from double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional right 2 that is im3
posed upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.
The underlying rationale of double jeopardy is that the state should
not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual to
embarrass him and compel him to live in a continuous state of anxiety
and insecurity.4 Prior to adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court in Fox v. Ohio held that double jeopardy was largely a

federal concern, and in no way applied to the states.5 While the Bill of
Rights already contained the double-jeopardy clause, many states never22. See supra note 17.
1. Benton v. Maryland, 89 S.Ct. 2056 (1969). Because the grand and petit juries had
been unconstitutionally selected under a section of the state constitution that demanded jurors to swear their belief in the existence of God, the Maryland Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court where defendant was given the "option"
of serving his ten-year sentence for burglary, or demanding reindictment and a new
trial.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V'"... [NIor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."
3. Maryland argued one cannot be placed in jeopardy by a void indictment. The
Supreme Court found that only by accepting a new trial could the former indictment
and sentence be set aside. There was really no choice or option involved and one cannot
be forced to waive his rights of former jeopardy.
4. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
5. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
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theless inserted a similar protection in their state constitutions, 6 but with
varied interpretations.7
After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,8 the Court in Palko
v. Connecticut,9 placed some double jeopardy limitations upon the states
through the due-process clause. Subject to their constitutional provisions the states were still generally free to apply their own unique
double-jeopardy meaning to determine when jeopardy attached. 10 Both
the municipality and the state could prosecute when jurisdiction overlapped, and if the defendant appealed for a new trial he was generally
held to have "waived" former jeopardy." Furthermore, the state prosecution could appeal and continue the case until it culminated in one
error-free trial.' 2 A denial of due process occurred only when the
jeopardy was "so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure
it."

13

In recent years, certain privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights
have been incorporated in the fourteenth amendment by a process of
"selective incorporation." 14 In Benton the Supreme Court said, "For the
same reasons, we today find that the double jeopardy prohibition . . .
represents a fundamental idea in our constitutional heritage, [and that]
6. J. SixGLR, DourLz JEoPAay 78, 79 n.6 (1969). All but five states have constitutional
provisions against double jeopardy: Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and Vermont.
7. Id. at 79. Thirty-seven states have the same terminology as in the Fifth Amendment, but apply their own meaning and exceptions.
8. US. CoNsr. amend. XIV § I. "No state shall make or enforce any laws which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
9. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (the crux of Palko was a case-by-case determination of fundamental fairness considering the totality of circumstances).
10. J. Sicuxa, DOUBLE JEoPADY 77-117 (1969).
11. Id.
12. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
13. Id.
14. Note, The Incorporation Doctrine: Sixth Amendment Trial by Jury, 15 How.
LJ. 164 (1968). See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (the right to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) (the right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (the
right to confrontation of opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(the fifth amendment right to self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U.S.
335 (1963) (the sixth amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1964) (the fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (the right to a public trial); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927) (the first amendment right of free speech, press, and religion); Chicago
B & Q Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (the right to compensation for property
taken by the state).
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the same constitutional standards apply against both the state and federal governments." 15

Benton appears to be a logical step in the Court's recent trend of
making the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights the standard in
determining whether due process requirements have been met. It is
another step towards incorporating all of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment. States must conform to the federal standard
of double jeopardy that prohibits an appeal at the instance of the prosecution 16 once jeopardy has attached.17 The Palko approach is abrogated and federal concepts will apply to the states under one uniform
law. Benton, however, creates a need for legislative and judicial action
to establish a clear rule for the states in the areas of competing jurisdictions,' 8 multiple prosecutions 9 and where a single illegal act violates
both state and federal laws.2° Benton overrules a double standard of
15. 89 S.Ct. at 2062.
16. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Congress has granted federal
courts "limited" right to appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the United States
Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1949, 62 Stat. 844, as amended,
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964). The appeal must be based upon the validity or construction
of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded, or when the
defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
17. A person is put in jeopardy, by federal standards, when he is regularly charged
with a crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try him, and if
trial by jury, when the jury has been called and charged with the deliverance of the
accused. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904); Clawens v. Rives, 104
F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (when any evidence is heard, or testimony received, but
before opening argument). In cases of "manifest necessity" an exception is made to
the rule of attachment, and the trial judge is permitted at his discretion to order a
new trial. See, e.g., Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916) (irregularity in the
indictment); Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (termination of a
court term, other emergencies or unusual circumstances); Simmons v. United States,
142 U.S. 148 (1891) (jurors acquaintaince with the accused); United States v. Perez,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579 (1824) (if the jury cannot agree); United States v. Potash, 118
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941) (illness of a juror); See Note, Double Jeopardy and the Doctrine
of Manifest Necessity, 20 N.Y.U. INmaA. L. Rav. 189 (1965).
18. In Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1958) the Court approved the state's
version of double jeopardy thereby permitting separate trials and multiple convictions
arising from the "same criminal transactions" holding that the jeopardy determination
must be "picked out in the facts and circumstances of each case.' See Biglow,
Former Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11 Rrroas L. REv. 487 (1957).
19. Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). The Court deferred to the state double
jeopardy policy and permitted four murders occurring simultaneously to be tried
separately, declaring if there were no showing of "fundamental unfairness" in the
state's procedure due process would not be violated.
20. In United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) the defendant illegally transported
liquor violating both state and federal laws. The Court upheld separate prosecutions
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jeopardy protection that existed in America since the time of the Bill
of Rights. It is today "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 21
LAWRENCE J. LPKA

by each authority and held the double jeopardy clause inapplicable since it only
restricted federal prosecutions. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). The
defendant was acquitted in a federal court but subsequently convicted in a state court
for the same offense. The Court held, in a five-to-four decision, that there was no
double jeopardy bar to such a threat of double punishment.
21. 89 S. Ct.2056 (1969).

